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CHILDHOOD, INTERRUPTED: ENCOURAGING
THE DE-INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF UTAH’S STATE HOSPITAL
Sara Montoya*
In the long term, institutionalization in early childhood increases the
likelihood that impoverished children will grow into psychiatrically
impaired and economically unproductive adults.1
This bold statement summarizes the findings reported in an article coauthored
by four pediatric physicians about the detrimental and long-lasting effects of
placing children in institutional care. This theory is neither contentious nor
revolutionary. And it is by no means a well-kept secret, guarded by the psychiatric
and medical elite against discovery by policy makers on Capitol Hill. On the
contrary, advocacy groups, lawmakers, even former President George W. Bush
have all been made sharply aware of the findings on institutionalized care. The
former president even took steps during his presidency toward finding solutions to
the problem of institutionalization.2 This attitude shift occurred largely in response3
to the Supreme Court’s decision in Olmstead v. L.C.,4 which interpreted the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to include protection for mentally ill
populations from unnecessary inpatient treatment, and calling it unlawful
discrimination to segregate such persons from society.5
A new approach to children’s mental health care arose from this attitude shift,
with policymakers implementing community-based and in-home interventions to
treat children and families together. Such interventions are not only highly
effective and much less degrading to the integrity of the family and child; they are
also significantly more cost efficient. This is not surprising—common sense
informs us that bringing the therapeutic tools of a hospital setting into the home
and transferring those skills from professional caretakers to parents is,
* © 2012 Sara Montoya, J.D. Candidate, 2012, S.J. Quinney College of Law,
University of Utah; Utah Law Review Note and Comment Editor. I would like to thank the
staff and executive editors of the Utah Law Review for their help with this Note. I would
also like to extend a special thank you to the staff at the Disability Law Center for their
input, and to Robert B. Denton in particular for his detailed and insightful review.
1
Deborah A. Frank, Perri E. Klass, Felton Earls & Leon Eisenberg, Infants and
Young Children in Orphanages: One View from Pediatrics and Child Psychiatry, 97
PEDIATRICS 569, 569 (1996).
2
See President’s New Freedom Commission on Mental Health, Exec. Order No.
13,263, 3 C.F.R. § 233–35 (2003) (declaring the mission of the newly created Commission
to be “to recommend improvements to enable . . . children with serious emotional
disturbances to live, work, learn, and participate fully in their communities”).
3
See infra Part I.
4
Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
5
Id. at 598–602.
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metaphorically speaking, teaching a man to fish. Thus, investing in in-home
programming comes with the added bonus that eventually the taxpayer no longer
needs to continue providing “fish.” Successful outcomes emerging from more
recent deinstitutionalization efforts around the country are proving this logic to be
true. This paradigm shift has been slower to reach Utah, in part due to two
particularly alarming practices that continue to find support in the state: 1) the
continued funding of long-term inpatient stays at the Utah State Hospital,
compounded by the extensive investment in a building construction project at the
hospital that was recently approved by the Utah State Legislature, and 2) pushing
parents to relinquish custody as a method of obtaining Medicaid funding for
treatment.
This Note presents two possible litigation strategies advocates may utilize in
an attempt to compel the state to cease these practices and to incentivize policy
makers to implement systemic change more aggressively. First, Part I examines the
Supreme Court decision in Olmstead, wherein the practice of unnecessary
institutionalization in a psychiatric hospital was held to be a violation of the ADA.
The decision provided strong language suggesting not only that passive allowance
of such practices is unlawful discrimination, but also that a state has an affirmative
obligation to take reasonable steps to find and implement alternatives to
institutionalized care.6 Part II goes on to apply this holding and its precedent to the
state’s practice of providing long-term institutionalization at the Utah State
Hospital. Further, Part II also discusses the Utah State Legislature’s recent
approval of $25 million in funding to be used in part to rebuild the hospital’s
children’s wing—and the strong implications that allocating extensive state
resources toward further institutionalization will have for the Olmstead analysis.
This section concludes by urging that action be brought against the state for this
continued unlawful practice of affirmatively investing in continued
institutionalization, thus pushing the state to better allocate its funds toward
implementing more community-based programs.
Next, Part III analyzes the possible due process challenge that could be
brought against the state for its complacency in the practice of custody
relinquishment. This section will first examine the New York decision in Joyner v.
Dumpson,7 where a plaintiff’s class of nearly 5,000 children challenged New
York’s custody relinquishment scheme under the due process clause.8 While a
conclusion as to the results of such a challenge is highly fact-dependent, a number
of factors put forth by the Joyner decision weigh heavily in favor of the right
potential plaintiff who chooses to challenge the practice in Utah. A definitive
conclusion in this respect is difficult to reach, but this Note argues that judicial
leanings look favorable for a child or family who claims their family integrity was
destroyed for want of in-home mental health services.
6

Id. at 601–03.
Joyner v. Dumpson, 712 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1983).
8
Id. at 777.
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Finally, this Note concludes that these two litigation strategies appear
unfavorable for the state if challenges were brought against it, only strengthening
an already compelling argument that progress must be made to promote more
community and in-home children’s services. This long overdue paradigm shift is
necessary not only to preserve our families and our children, but also to preserve
and more shrewdly allocate Utah’s increasingly scarce state resources.
I. BACKGROUND
Besides the detrimental effects on the individual, institutionalized care is an
affront to civil rights. Such care is a modern and less-recognizable form of
segregation, separating mentally ill or disabled children and adults from the rest of
the population under the guise of “rehabilitation.”
The Supreme Court endorsed as much in its 1999 decision in Olmstead v.
L.C.9 Analyzing institutionalization as a form of discrimination prohibited by the
ADA, the Court pointed out that unjustified institutional placement constitutes a
form of discrimination10 and “perpetuates unwarranted assumptions that persons so
isolated are incapable or unworthy of participating in community life.”11 The
country took heed of this new category of discrimination and so began a movement
of deinstitutionalization.
Subsequent initiatives by state and federal legislation prompted the creation of
various models of community-based systems of care.12 As programs sprouted and
grew, so did research that demonstrated the efficacy of community-based treatment
and integrated systems of care. In a report to Congress, the Center for Mental
Health Services (CMHS) provided data about children in forty-five different
community-based systems of care after eighteen months of receiving services.13
CMHS reported, among other benefits, a reduction in behavioral and emotional
problems, an increase in clinical functioning, an improvement in school
performance and attendance, less law enforcement involvement, and lower
caregiver strain.14 As the rest of the nation has continued to move toward a new
system of integrated and community-based mental health care, Utah has resisted
9

See Olmstead, 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
Id. at 600.
11
Id.
12
See Donna Folkemer & Barbara Coleman, Long-term Care Reform: Legislative
Efforts to Shift Care to the Community, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Dec. 2006),
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=14479.
13
SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., THE COMPREHENSIVE
COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES FOR CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES PROGRAM:
EVALUATION FINDINGS: ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 1 (2004) [hereinafter SAMHSA
REPORT], available at www.store.samhsa.gov/product/Comprehensive-Community-Mental
-Health-Services-for-Children-and-Their-Families-Program-Evaluation-Findings-AnnualReport-to-Congress-2004/SMA-CB-E2004.
14
Id. at 30–36.
10
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the movement. Utah is one of only two surveyed states15 that continue to fund the
most restrictive level of care available: inpatient hospitalization.16 Furthermore,
Utah spent $20 million on the second-most restrictive level of care—residential
treatment—during the last legislative session.17 Not only are these levels of
treatment the most costly methods of treating only very limited numbers of
children, they contravene current research that demonstrates improved outcomes
when service providers work with children and their families together.18 Utah
would benefit both in treatment outcomes and in cost efficiency by moving away
from these methods of care.
A far cry from deinstitutionalization, the state of Utah has instead decided to
further invest in inpatient care. In the 2009, the 2010, and the 2011 legislative
sessions, the Utah State Hospital requested funding to construct two new
buildings,19 one of which would house the children’s psychiatric wing.20 In
February 2011, the hospital presented its request for $30,881,000 to the
Infrastructure and General Government Subcommittee21 and in March was
ultimately approved for a grant of $25,000,000.22 When discussing this proposal, it
is also useful to discuss the subsequent cost of treating a child once the new
building is completed. It was estimated in 2007 that a pediatric bed in the Utah
State Hospital costs $439 per day, per child,23 accumulating over the course of a
median stay of over thirteen months.24 Compare this with the estimate that the
same level of care, when provided in a community-based program, can cost less

15

OFFICE OF THE UTAH LEGIS. AUDITOR GEN., REPORT TO THE UTAH LEGISLATURE
NO. 2008–04, A PERFORMANCE AUDIT OF THE UTAH STATE HOSPITAL 37 (2008)
[hereinafter PERFORMANCE AUDIT OF USH], available at http://le.utah.gov/audit/08_
04rpt.pdf (reporting that out of seven western states surveyed, only Colorado and Utah
reported having designated children’s beds at a state facility).
16
DARCY GRUTTADARO ET AL., REINVESTING IN THE COMMUNITY: A FAMILY GUIDE
TO EXPANDING HOME AND COMMUNITY-BASED MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES AND SUPPORTS
9 (2009), available at http://www.namiut.org/inform-yourself/childrens-issues (follow
“Reinvesting in the Community” hyperlink).
17
Id.; Letter from Sherri D. Wittwer, Exec. Dir., Nat’l Alliance on Mental Illness, to
Utah Legislature (May 25, 2010) (on file with author).
18
GRUTTADARO ET AL., supra note 16, at 9–10.
19
Letter from Sherri D. Wittwer to Utah Legislature, supra note 17; PERFORMANCE
AUDIT OF USH, supra note 15, at 38.
20
PERFORMANCE AUDIT OF USH, supra note 15, at 38.
21
OFFICE OF THE LEGIS. FISCAL ANALYST, CAPITAL DEVELOPMENTS: BUDGET BRIEF,
GEN. SESS. 2 (2011) [hereinafter BUDGET BRIEF].
22
UTAH CODE ANN. § 63B-20-101(2)(c) (West 2011).
23
BUDGET BRIEF, supra note 21, at 3.
24
DIV. OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT ON
PUBLIC SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES IN UTAH 101 (2005)
[hereinafter DSAMH REPORT], available at http://www.dsamh.utah.gov/docs/fy2005
report.pdf.
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than half that of per-day institutional care,25 and does not require the $25 million
starting price tag. With the legislative approval of this costly project, the state is
wasting valuable funds on perpetuating the unlawful and drastically inefficient
tradition of inpatient treatment that breaks up families. If the state faces pressure
from legal action as proposed below, the project’s demise can act as a catalyst to
more effectively allocate our state dollars and evolve to a more effective, dignified,
and efficient system of care that will in turn build stronger families and
communities. The following proposed legal challenges can act as the incentive for
policymakers to progress toward modern theories of community-based care. These
proposed litigation strategies seize on the national attitude shift that has begun
creating a new way of thinking about the mentally ill.
II. CHALLENGING INSTITUTIONALIZED CARE
AS A VIOLATION OF TITLE II OF THE ADA
Of the most recent challenges to states’ failure to provide children and adults
with alternatives to institutionalized care, the most successful have come in the
form of claimed violations of Title II of the ADA. These challenges follow from
the famous Supreme Court decision in Olmstead v. L.C., holding that, “the
proscription of discrimination may require placement of persons with mental
disabilities in community settings rather than in institutions”26 when certain
conditions are met. This decision prompted extensive chatter among advocacy
groups at both a national and a local level.
To offer only a few examples of the response generated by the decision, the
Surgeon General in September 2000 hosted The Surgeon General’s Conference on
Children’s Mental Health: Developing a National Action Agenda in Washington,
DC.27 Similarly, in June 1999, legal advocates of persons with physical and mental
disabilities met “to discuss the implications of the ruling”28 in Olmstead, as well as
to develop recommended strategies for states to implement more community-based
services to comply with the Court’s holding.29 Both of these meetings of minds
reached a similar consensus: state resources—as well as local, state, and federal
25

Ashli J. Sheidow et al., Treatment Costs for Youths Receiving Multisystemic
Therapy or Hospitalization After a Psychiatric Crisis, 55 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 548 (May
2004), available at http://ps.psychiatryonline.org/article.aspx?articleid=88594.
26
527 U.S. 581, 587 (1999).
27
David Satcher, Report of the Surgeon General’s Conference on Children’s Mental
Health: A National Action Agenda, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (2000)
[hereinafter SURGEON GENERAL REPORT], http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/topics/cmh/
childreport.html.
28
JUDGE DAVID L. BAZELON CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW, UNDER COURT
ORDER: THE SUPREME COURT’S RULING IN OLMSTEAD V. L.C., at Foreword (1999)
[hereinafter UNDER COURT ORDER], available at http://www.bazelon.org/NewsPublications.aspx (follow “Publications” hyperlink; then follow “Olmstead” hyperlink).
29
Id.
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policy initiatives—ought to be centered around encouraging community
integration of mental health care services whenever possible.30
The Olmstead decision, as well as the commentary that ensued and the
various challenges mental health advocates brought against states under its
precedential authority, all endeavor to establish a standard by which states are able
to gauge the extent of responsibility they owe to their mentally ill populations.31
This section first discusses the opinion itself, and then examines the commentary
and controversies that have shed further light on the implications of this decision
for state mental health care systems.
A. The Opinion: Olmstead v. L.C.
Olmstead v. L.C. began as a challenge brought by two women with
intellectual disabilities against the state of Georgia.32 The women had been
voluntarily admitted into care at the Georgia Regional Hospital at Atlanta and
although their treatment professionals later concluded they were appropriate for
further treatment in a community-based program, the women were not released—
purportedly due to inadequate funding of community services.33
The district court ordered the state to place the women in a community-based
program and held that “unnecessary institutional segregation of the disabled
constitutes discrimination per se” under Title II of the ADA.34 To establish a claim
under Title II, a plaintiff must show that 1) he or she is a person with a qualified
disability, 2) he or she was excluded from participation or denied services,
benefits, etc. of a public entity, and 3) this discrimination was the result of his or
her disability.35 Further, Title II asserts that states are required to “administer
services, programs, and activities in the most integrated setting appropriate to the
needs of qualified individuals with disabilities.”36 This provision is limited in that
30

SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 27; UNDER COURT ORDER, supra note 28,

at 1.
31

See, e.g., Terence Ng et al., Home and Community Based Services: Introduction to
Olmstead Lawsuits and Olmstead Plans, UCSF NAT’L CTR. FOR PERS. ASSISTANCE
SERVICES. (Aug. 2011), http://www.pascenter.org/olmstead/olmsteadcases.php; JUDGE
DAVID L. BAZELON CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW, MERGING SYSTEM OF CARE
PRINCIPLES WITH CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: OLMSTEAD PLANNING FOR CHILDREN WITH SERIOUS
EMOTIONAL DISTURBANCE 2–4 (2001), available at http://www.bazelon.org/NewsPublications.aspx (follow “Publications” hyperlink; then follow “Olmstead” hyperlink);
UNDER COURT ORDER, supra note 28.
32
527 U.S. 581, 593 (1999).
33
Id. at 593–94.
34
Id. at 594.
35
See Ann K. Wooster, When Does a Public Entity Discriminate Against Disabled
Individuals in Provision of Services, Programs, or Activities Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 12132, 163 A.L.R. FED. 339 (2000).
36
28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (2010).
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states are required to make “reasonable modifications” to their policies to avoid
discriminatory practices.37 Also, a defense is available if the state can demonstrate
that making such modifications would “fundamentally alter” the nature of the
service or program.38
Georgia claimed in its defense that the third element of the ADA claim—that
the plaintiffs had been discriminated against because of their disability—had not
been met. Georgia claimed that inadequate funding of community programs had
been the reason for continued hospitalization, not discrimination by reason of their
disability.39 Thus, the state asserted that without adequate funding, immediate
transfers to community-based services would fundamentally alter the hospital’s
program.40
The district court rejected Georgia’s inadequate funding defense, finding that
segregated treatment of the mentally disabled constitutes discrimination per se
under the ADA and “cannot be justified by inadequate funding.”41 The court
looked to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit for this
proposition, which had rejected a cost-based defense in an ADA claim filed by a
nursing home patient.42 The Third Circuit ruled in favor of the patient and
concluded that whenever a state chooses to provide services under the ADA, it
must comport with its provisions—referring in particular to the provision that
prohibits unnecessary segregation as a form of discrimination.43
The district court then turned to Georgia’s claim that requiring an immediate
transfer to community services would “fundamentally alter” the state’s programs.
Most significantly, the court emphasized two specific facts in its analysis of the
issue: first, that Georgia already had in place community services that were
appropriate for the women, and second that providing care in an institutional
setting is twice as costly as providing services in the community.44 The court used
these facts to support its finding that Georgia would not have to fundamentally
alter its program to provide community-based care in the face of its economic
shortfalls.45
On appeal, the Unites States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
modified the district court’s analysis, affirming the lower court’s holding that
treating the women in a segregated institution when they were appropriate for more
37

Id. § 35.130(b)(7) (requiring “reasonable modifications” to avoid discrimination,
“unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the modifications would
fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity”).
38
Id.
39
L.C. ex rel. Zimring v. Olmstead, No. 1:95-CV-1210-MHS, 1997 WL 148674, at
*3 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 26, 1997).
40
Id.
41
Id. at *4.
42
Id. (citing Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325 (3rd Cir. 1995)).
43
Helen L., 46 F.3d at 333–39.
44
Zimring, 1997 WL 148674, at *4 & n.4.
45
Id. at *4.
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integrated community-based treatment programs constituted discrimination under
the ADA.46 However, the appellate court disapproved of the lower court’s broad
rejection of a cost-based defense, expressing concern that the holding had
essentially “ruled out” a lack of funding justification.47 The court did not wholly
disagree with the district court’s conclusion; it instead specified that it was clear
that Congress intended to permit a lack of funding defense, but only in “the most
limited of circumstances.”48 In this way, the appellate court attempted to provide
some protection for states to raise cost-based defenses.
The court concluded that the cost-based defense ought to be upheld if it could
be shown that ordering the state to transfer the two women to community-based
programs would so impact Georgia’s strapped budget that it would constitute a
“fundamental alteration” to the state’s programming.49 The court then remanded
the case to the district court to determine whether this “fundamental alteration”
finding could be made.50
The court cited three factors to be considered in determining whether a state
can establish a fundamental alteration: first, whether the costs of integrated
services would be unreasonable in light of the demands of the state’s mental health
budget.51 Second, whether it would be unreasonable to require states to use
available Medicaid waiver slots.52 And third, whether any difference in the cost of
institutional versus community-based care would lessen the state’s financial
burden.53
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Eleventh Circuit’s holding in
substantial part.54 The Court agreed that unjustified institutionalization constitutes
a form of unlawful discrimination prohibited under the ADA and must be remedied
by states when it is reasonable in light of certain factors.55 The Court, however,
disagreed on what factors to consider in making this reasonableness determination.
Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence found the requirements for establishing a
“fundamental-alteration” cost-based defense still too burdensome for a state to
46

L.C. ex rel. Zimring v. Olmstead, 138 F.3d 893, 895 (11th Cir. 1998).
Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 595 (1999) (citation omitted).
48
Zimring, 138 F.3d at 902.
49
Id. at 904–05.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id. The court considered in some detail the availability of Medicaid waivers that
allowed the state to spend Medicaid dollars to provide community-based care to those not
eligible for institutionalized care. Id. at 904. These waivers, known as “Home and
Community-based Services” (HCBS) waivers, are discussed in more detail infra Part
II.B.3.
53
Zimring, 138 F.3d at 904–05.
54
Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 597 (1999) (affirming essential
holding but concluding that the Eleventh Circuit had imposed an “unduly restrictive”
remand instruction).
55
Id.
47
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meet if only considering the costs of care for two individuals against an entire
state’s mental health budget.56 Such a showing would be virtually impossible for a
state to make. Instead, Justice Ginsburg found it important to consider a state’s
need to provide a multitude of services to the diverse population of mentally ill
patients in its care.57
Justice Ginsburg recognized that while the cost of community-based care is
far lower than institutionalized care in a simple comparison of the two, the cost
analysis when releasing individual patients to community programs is far more
complicated.58 Instead—due in part to high overhead costs associated with running
an inpatient program—the release of a few individual patients saves virtually no
money for the state, while funding the community programs to which these
patients are released actually causes additional expenditures for the state.59 This
was essentially an attempt to protect each individual state’s right to choose how to
administer its own programs, so long as reasonable efforts were made to encourage
the most integrated and least discriminatory programming possible.60
Justice Stevens, concurring separately, instead felt that determining
reasonableness ought to be a question for the lower courts and would have
preferred to simply affirm the court of appeals.61 This would permit courts to make
a simple comparison of community-based treatment costs versus inpatient
treatment costs per individual; a comparison that Justice Ginsburg recognized
would leave virtually no cost-based defense to states. In this way, the standard set
by Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence actually provides more protection for state
budgets and leaves plaintiffs with a bigger burden to meet. For this reason, the
remainder of the analysis will consider the costs of the Utah State Hospital under
the more demanding Ginsburg standard.
B. Potential Liability Theories in Utah
Since the Olmstead decision, subsequent cases applying the Court’s analysis
have highlighted determinative factors that may tip the scales in favor of a
plaintiff, particularly when ruling on a state’s fundamental-alteration defense. For
example, courts have rejected as defenses general fiscal problems faced by the
state and the argument that modifying services to fit a community rather than a

56

Id. at 605 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
Id. at 605–06.
58
See id. at 606 (recognizing that limited availability and waiting lists for community
programs complicate the cost analysis).
59
Id.
60
Id. at 605 (“To maintain a range of facilities and to administer services with an even
hand, the State must have more leeway than the courts below understood the fundamentalalteration defense to allow.”).
61
Id. at 607 (Stevens, J., concurring).
57
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hospital context will fundamentally alter programming.62 Conversely, states are
able to avoid liability if they are able to demonstrate they have a plan to reduce
institutionalization and have made “sufficient efforts” to implement that plan, such
as increasing the use of Medicaid waivers, budgeting for community programming,
using waiting lists to transition patients, planning new facilities, or reducing
institutionalization rates.63
Besides lawsuits, Olmstead prompted waves of innovative programming and
funding solutions across the country for both the mentally disabled and mentally ill
populations alike. Children’s mental health services have been part of this
movement, with cases both past and current being brought by advocacy groups
against states to enforce implementation of the Supreme Court’s ruling in this
unique setting.64 Utah has thus far avoided any major litigation over its children’s
mental health inpatient services, or its lack of comprehensive community-based
programming. Viewed under the standards set forth in Olmstead, as well as in
subsequent cases brought under the Olmstead precedent,65 the state of Utah is
highly vulnerable to litigation by advocacy groups or families due to its slow pace
in developing a comprehensive system of community-based mental health services,
as well as its continued practice of treating children at the Utah State Hospital.
This section details three specific factors that would likely tip a court in favor of a
plaintiff bringing an Olmstead complaint against the state of Utah.
1. Legislative Approval of a Costly New Children’s Wing at the Utah State
Hospital
In 2011, the Utah Legislature approved the Utah State Hospital’s request to
for $25 million in funding to build a new facility to house the children’s wing of
the psychiatric hospital. This construction project modifies the analysis such that
Utah may be more vulnerable to claims that it is in violation of the ADA.
Under the least restrictive construction of a state’s obligations under Title II
of the ADA, a state must show that it would be an inequitable allocation of its
mental health resources to expend funds providing court-ordered services for
62

See Fisher v. Oklahoma Health Care Authority, 335 F.3d 1175 (10th Cir. 2003);
Townsend v. Quasim, 328 F.3d 511 (9th Cir. 2003).
63
See ARC of Washington State Inc. v. Braddock, 427 F.3d 615 (9th Cir. 2005);
Sanchez v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2005); Williams v. Wasserman, 164
F.Supp.2d 591 (D.Md. 2001).
64
See, e.g., Katie A. v. Bonta, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1065 (C.D. Cal. 2006), rev’d and
remanded sub nom. Katie A. ex rel. Ludin v. Los Angeles County, 481 F.3.d 1150 (9th Cir.
2007); Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 1–4, J.B. v. Barbour (S.D. Miss.
2010) (No. 3:10-cv-00153-HTW-LRA).
65
See TERENCE NG, ALICE WONG & CHARLENE HARRINGTON, UCSF NAT’L CTR. FOR
PERS. ASSISTANCE SERVICES, HOME AND COMMUNITY BASED SERVICES: COMMUNITY
INTEGRATION – OLMSTEAD AND OLMSTEAD-RELATED LAWSUITS, at tbl. 2 (Aug. 2011),
available at http://www.pascenter.org/olmstead/olmsteadcases.php.
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individual plaintiffs to the detriment of services provided for other mentally
disabled persons in the state.66 However, even with this interpretation of states’
obligations as being minimal, the Court held that segregated and highly restrictive
treatment programs ought to be minimized as much as is reasonably possible, as
such programs are nonetheless unlawful discrimination prohibited by the ADA.67
To determine whether a state has minimized undesirable programming as
much as reasonably possible, a court takes into account the resources available to
the state, and looks for state attempts to make and implement a plan to decrease
institutionalization.68 Applying such a standard to the recent funds allocated to
rebuild the Utah State Hospital, one would be hard pressed to argue that Utah is
maximizing its budget to implement new community-based services or has
formulated a plan to do so. Contrary to “reasonably possible,” it seems instead
entirely unreasonable to expend $25 million to further fund programming that the
Court is demanding be minimized. And while courts recognize states’ needs to
maintain lightly populated institutions while implementing the necessary
programming, this caveat is largely inapplicable where, ten years after Olmstead,
the Hospital continues to treat a disproportionately small population of children for
such an unreasonable length of time.
While Justice Ginsburg in Olmstead looked at calculations of overhead costs
for institutions and pointed out the high cost of running even a very lightly
populated institution, she made the case that a state need not expend additional
funds it does not have in attempting to comply with court orders, even though such
a scheme would be more cost efficient over time.69 The purpose of this, however,
was not to allow states an open-ended and indefinite lack of funding defense.
Rather, when Justice Ginsburg permitted this limited defense for states, her
intention was to allow states leeway to administer services at their own discretion,
but with the caveat that states must not passively allow segregated services to
continue without making an effort to slowly implement more integrated treatment
options.70 Allocating more state dollars to rebuild the inpatient facilities, rather
than using these newfound dollars to implement community-based programs,
seems to blatantly disregard the “reasonably possible” standard.
As the Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law argues, states must work at
developing comprehensive community programs to reduce unnecessary
institutionalization in order to be in compliance with the ruling.71 As far as
66
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resources go, Bazelon argues that the decision suggests that state reallocation of
resources may be compelled: “states need to look both at services that are currently
funded and at how community services might be funded if the state took action to
maximize its budget.”72 With the State Hospital’s new grant acting to maximize the
state’s budget to fund more inpatient services, the door may be open for a plaintiff
to argue that these resources ought to be used to fund integrated treatment options
that comply with the ADA and Olmstead. Such an extensive allocation of
resources demonstrates more than a passive allowance of continued discrimination
of children with mental illness.
Finally, the recently allocated funds may be generally problematic as applied
to the fundamental-alteration defense factors discussed above. They demonstrate
Utah’s commitment to maintaining segregated care, undermine any fiscal defense
that could be offered by the state, and suggest that the state is actually doing the
opposite of formulating and implementing a plan to decrease segregated care.
2. Length-of-Stay Analysis
A second factor that would potentially weigh significantly in an ADA
challenge against the state of Utah is the average length of a child’s stay in the
Utah State Hospital. While the Olmstead decision does not discuss the length of
hospitalization in its analysis, it clearly prohibits “unnecessary”
institutionalization.73 Such language may open the door for arguments criticizing
the “necessity” of excessively long periods of institutionalization. If such
arguments are to be successful, they will very likely succeed in a case against the
state of Utah, due to very excessive lengths of stay reported for children in the
Utah State Hospital.
In 2005, the Division of Substance Abuse and Mental Health (DSAMH)
issued a report on public substance abuse and mental health services in Utah. In the
report, DSAMH calculated the median length of stay for children aged six to
thirteen in the Utah State Hospital at 419 days.74 Compare this number to the
average length of stay at the only other western state facility that designates
children’s psychiatric beds, Colorado.75 Colorado reported an average length of
stay for children aged zero to twelve of approximately eleven days.76 This is
significantly shorter than those reported in Utah. Further, the median length of stay
for “youth,” or children aged thirteen to eighteen, in the Utah State Hospital was
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218 days,77 versus Colorado’s average of approximately ten days for adolescent
children aged thirteen to seventeen.78
These dramatically higher numbers in the state of Utah may be open to a
challenge on “necessity” grounds. The ever-growing body of research
demonstrating that community-based interventions—even for children who qualify
for inpatient levels of care—are as effective or more effective than costly and
harmful institutionalized care only strengthens these arguments.79 With such
effective interventions available, it becomes less and less likely that a court will be
sufficiently convinced of the necessity of a child’s thirteen-month stay in a highly
segregated institution so as to dismiss an ADA challenge.
3. Lack of Use of Medicaid Waivers to Help Fund Community-Based Services
The Supreme Court noted in its decision that Georgia failed to take full
advantage of the Medicaid waivers available to it to fund the provision of services
in community-based programs.80 The waivers make available federal funds for
children who might not otherwise qualify for certain Medicaid funds.81 The idea
behind these waivers is to allow Medicaid dollars that would eventually go toward
funding an institutional stay to instead go to pay for more integrated, and
preventative, services.82
The Court pointed out specifically that “by 1996, ‘HHS approved up to 2109
waiver slots for Georgia, but Georgia used only 700’” and cited this statistic in
support of its assertion that the federal government encourages states to provide
more community-based treatment programs.83
When applying the Court’s language, evidence of a failure to access these
funds would strongly support a plaintiff’s assertion that a state had not made
reasonable modifications to its programs so as to accommodate treatment needs in
the community, in compliance with the ADA. Specifically, when “taking into
77
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account the resources available to the state,”84 such evidence of unused waiver
slots would support a finding that valuable resources had gone ignored. Thus,
ignoring resources that would be capable of supporting community treatment
programs would not be in compliance with the Supreme Court’s mandate that
unnecessary institutionalization must be addressed by state action to make any
reasonable modifications.
To analyze Utah’s current practices with regard to Medicaid waivers, it may
be best to compare and contrast with a state that has taken notable advantage of the
federal waiver program available. While nearly every state has secured waivers to
develop programs for the developmentally disabled, far fewer states have adopted
the waiver for use in developing children’s mental health services.85 Only three
states in 2005 had secured Medicaid waivers to support children’s mental health
care programs: Kansas, New York, and Vermont.86 Kansas has made significant
strides in its process of deinstitutionalization, in significant part through use of the
Medicaid 1915(c) Home and Community-Based Services (HCBS) waiver.87
Kansas first used the Medicaid HCBS waiver in 1997, after it shut down its
children’s psychiatric hospital.88 The state has been able to successfully treat
children requiring a hospital level of care through intensive home and community
services, with success measured by factors such as a child’s permanent status at
home, his or her school performance, and the level of involvement with juvenile
justice.89 The state has further expanded its waiver program, and has seen the
annual per-child cost of children’s mental health services decrease by more than
half when compared to institutionalization costs per child.90
Utah has entirely neglected to access such a waiver to alternatively fund
community-based children’s mental health services, although it is eligible and
would likely qualify for such a waiver.91 In the reasonable modifications analysis,
this factor might tip a court in favor of finding Utah in violation of the ADA.
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These three factors, either alone or taken together, may push a court to uphold
an ADA challenge against the state of Utah, based on the current status of its
children’s mental health care services.
III. CHALLENGING THE PRACTICE OF CUSTODY RELINQUISHMENT
AS AN IMPINGEMENT OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS RIGHTS
An alternative litigation strategy to prompt state action in building
community-based children’s mental health services arises from the state’s practice
of requiring a parent to relinquish custody of their child to the state so their child
can qualify for Medicaid services. This is a problem that nearly half of the states
are currently battling or have struggled with in the past,92 and one that is widely
affecting families who are currently accessing the mental health care system—or
those who are contemplating doing so.93
States have dealt with this practice in different ways. In 2003, three members
of Congress requested a report from the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
on the occurrence of custody relinquishment across the country.94 The GAO found
that states widely diverged on this issue.95 In eleven states, statutory schemes
allowed for voluntary placement of children in child welfare systems to access
mental health care without requiring full custody relinquishment.96 In six states and
the District of Columbia, statutes were in place that actively prohibited the

psychiatric hospitals, however Utah would qualify because the state has cost data on
serving children in a hospital setting.”).
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practice.97 In the remaining states, there were no statutes addressing the issue at
all.98
While the GAO has issued no follow-up reports, the commissioners of the
GAO report gave testimony at a Senate hearing suggesting that shortly after the
report was released several more states moved to enact bans on custody
relinquishment.99 Utah, however, has not addressed the issue through statute, either
to prohibit the practice or to regulate it through voluntary placement schemes, and
has made no future commitment to do so.100
In a similarly silent manner, Utah keeps no data on the practice.101 No state
agencies currently collect or track data about how often the decision is posed to
families, or how often custody relinquishment is agreed to.102 However, both the
National Alliance on Mental Illness (NAMI) in Utah and the Disability Law Center
have received anecdotal reports of the practice.103 Also, common sense indicates
that to be financing a costly stay in either residential treatment or the Utah State
Hospital without much assistance from private health insurance,104 Utah families
must be finding some way to qualify their children for public funds in order to
meet the demands of such burdensome costs of high levels of treatment.
Because this practice is the consequence of high costs of treatment too
burdensome for most families, it is likely flourishing in the state of Utah. This is an
expected result of the lengthy and costly stays in either the Utah State Hospital or
residential treatment, as well as the corresponding lack of options for lower-cost
community-based services. Further still, the lack of Medicaid waiver programs that
would provide alternatives to some families seeking to keep their children at home
narrows the choices for families faced with this dilemma. Not surprisingly, lower
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cost community-based options are often cited as an effective solution to the
custody relinquishment problem.105
Thus, the custody relinquishment scheme exists as a sort of subset problem of
institutionalization, in tandem with other issues that are caused by the high costs of
inpatient care and issues that cause custody relinquishment. As such, litigation
strategies to address one may thereby address the other as a natural consequence.
The following is an analysis of a potential substantive due process challenge to the
practice of custody relinquishment in Utah.
A. The Opinion: Joyner v. Dumpson
There is little precedent in the area of custody relinquishment challenges.
Joyner v. Dumpson,106 arising out of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, appears to be the leading case providing guidance in analyzing a
substantive due process claim that challenges custody relinquishment practices.107
Significantly, the opinion was issued long before the aforementioned mental health
movements that currently promote family and community-based treatment options.
The claim in Joyner arose from a custody relinquishment statute in New York
state that actively required parents to relinquish custody to the state “as a
prerequisite to” receiving mental health services.108 The statutory scheme
effectively regulated the practice of custody relinquishment, requiring the state
social services agency to negotiate and draft a written voluntary transfer of custody
agreement with the family.109 Additionally, a second requirement stipulated that a
family court must approve any such agreement when the custody arrangement
could last more than thirty days.110
A class of plaintiffs, approximately 5,000 children, brought suit in federal
court, alleging that the custody relinquishment practice constituted a violation of
their substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, both facially
and as applied.111 The district court granted partial summary judgment for the
plaintiffs, finding that the scheme “infringed [their] fundamental right to ‘family
integrity’ . . . violating their substantive due process rights . . . ”112
The court of appeals reversed, following a three-step substantive due process
analysis, looking at: 1) whether the claimed right is fundamental under the
105
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Fourteenth Amendment, 2) whether the state infringed that right, and 3) whether
such infringement was justified by an important state interest.113 Significantly, the
court first held that the right to family integrity, or “the right of the family to
remain together without the coercive interference of the awesome power of the
state”114 was a fundamental, constitutionally protected right.115 The appellate court,
however, disagreed with the district court’s finding that under a facial challenge
this right had been infringed, for three specific reasons. First, the court did not see
the New York statute as a relinquishment of the parents’ “right to rear their
children,” because the voluntary transfer agreements protected those rights by
defining “custody” narrowly.116 Second, the statute on its face declared its
intention to be that of restoring families, once services were rendered.117 Third, the
court pointed out that the scheme, on its face, was clearly “voluntary” and the
parents ultimately had the right to choose whether to relinquish custody or not.118
The court then remanded the case for further analysis of the as-applied claim,
citing factual disputes to be resolved before the issue could be fully analyzed.119
The as-applied analysis remanded to the district court subsequently went
unresolved.120
B. Substantive Due Process As-Applied in Utah
Several factors weigh against the state of Utah if a plaintiff were to attempt to
revive substantive due process challenges today.121 First, there is an everexpanding and newly recognized right of those with mental disabilities to live at
home and participate in their communities and families, as demonstrated by former
president Bush’s executive order,122 cited in the foregoing discussion. This could
motivate a court to recognize an as-applied due process violation where it was
hesitant to do so before. The argument from Olmstead that integrated services are
necessary to protect the integrity of the mentally disabled could be used to oppose
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states that allow custody relinquishment, as this fractures the child-family
relationship and by extension threatens “family integrity.”
Second, Utah’s failure to enact a statute regulating custody relinquishment
could leave the state more vulnerable to an as-applied challenge. The analysis
would proceed as set out above. First, the court would determine whether “family
integrity” is a fundamental right under the Fourteenth Amendment, which has been
held to be so.123
Next, the court would need to determine whether the state infringed that right.
The analysis here would diverge from Joyner, because a court would no longer be
analyzing a statutory scheme on its face, but rather the actual practice of custody
relinquishment as alleged by a potential plaintiff. The court in Joyner pointed out
such facts as the narrow definition of “custody” in the statute, the fact that the
facial intention of the statute was family preservation, and the facial provision that
provided the custody transfer would be clearly “voluntary,” all in support of its
rejection of the contention that the statute was facially invalid.124
When addressed in Utah, however, the facial argument clearly fails because
there is no statute, so a court would not be able to dispose of such a claim as easily.
Further, where the court in Joyner was analyzing a statute meant to protect
children from the abuses of the practice, Utah has affirmatively failed to enact such
a statute or ban the practice in the thirty years since Joyner and the subsequent
criticisms of custody relinquishment. This would likely balance a court
unfavorably against the state in such a claim.
To be sure, such an analysis would be intensely fact specific and consequently
it is difficult to analyze without any specific case on hand. However, parents would
theoretically need first to demonstrate that the state effectively forced them to
choose between relinquishing custody or forgoing treatment. From there, one need
only demonstrate that forgoing treatment is not an option, because the state would
then be able to predicate a finding of neglect on the fact that the parents do not
access proper mental health care for the child. With the very limited sources of
community-based care currently narrowing parents’ alternative options, this lack of
choice might be easy for parents to show.
In sum, because access to community-based services is limited in Utah,
leaving costly and lengthy inpatient and residential treatment options as the only
choice for parents of severely emotionally disturbed children, it is likely that such a
case exists in the state where the parents have virtually no choice but custody
relinquishment. If such facts can be established and brought before a court, there is
a strong possibility that an as-applied challenge will stand.

123
124

Joyner, 712 F.2d at 778 (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982)).
Id. at 779.

92

UTAH ONLAW

[NO. 1

IV. CONCLUSION
While boasting a culture that is rich in family and community values, Utah
ought to be leading the way in developing and implementing a comprehensive and
efficient system of care that protects children and families by placing tools within
the home and the community to strengthen these core units of Utah society.
Further, with the Utah State Hospital at the end of its physical lifespan, and a
crippled economy requiring more budget pinching than ever, the timing is
particularly conducive to taking these crucial steps forward. With these litigation
tools, an advocacy group or family might be able to successfully gain judicial
support in the push to incentivize lawmakers to join the community-based services
movement.

